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Abstract 
This article draws upon discourse 
theoretical and psychoanalytical 
approaches to provide an overview 
on the potentiality of mourning as 
both a practice and a conceptual 
tool for the critical analysis of 
social and political phenomena. 
Within poststructuralist discourse 
theory, mourning has recently been 
considered a practice with the 
potential to engage in ‘ideological 
critique’. In contrast, stunted 
mourning and melancholia have 
been associated with being under 
the ‘grip of ideology’, affected by 
hegemonic discursive narratives 
and practices. By providing 
examples ranging from national 
identity to unemployment and class 
resubjectivation, the argument is 
made that mourning is a useful 
practice and analytical tool for 





from the experience of dislocation, 
even when it is not death related. 
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Introduction 
Meaning and the notion of subjectivity play a central role in structuring and 
understanding phenomena in the social world. Within the social sciences, 
poststructuralist discourse theory has been key in highlighting the need to 
incorporate these concepts in the research of social and political practices, as 
many of them could go unnoticed or insufficiently studied. Instances of loss, 
with death perhaps being its more representative one, are areas in social life 
which deserve attention for being unavoidable, beyond our control, and for 
the potential impact they can have on the rest of the network of social 
relations. As such, a body of research into them can discover and explore 
areas in which loss, its meaning to subjects and its affective dimension, 
maintains or transforms the status quo of social practices.  
Related to loss and death are two concepts which help uncover social 
practices that deal with their aftermath: mourning and melancholia. The way 
these have been studied generally focuses on the individual perspective that 
aims to understand an individual’s psyche. Nonetheless, as it will be explored, 
a number of rituals, practices and policies have interconnections with loss and 
death, and as such, the manner in which they are carried out and their 
success may be affected by the mourning process, sometimes substantively. 
For this reason, research into mourning processes which expands the scope 
from individual perspective to a wider perspective that covers social and 
political activities is needed.  
My aim in this article is to provide some insights about how the concept of 
mourning can be used to analyse contemporary social and political practices 
from a poststructuralist discourse theory perspective. My central thesis is that 
the concept is useful for the analysis of social practices that result from 
dislocation, even if they are not death-related. I argue that mourning can be 
seen as an ethical practice, wherein the contingent character of social reality 
is explicitly recognized and enables a person or a collective to successfully 
come to terms with it. This essay is divided into two main sections. The first 
section presents the theoretical perspectives with which to analyse the notion 
of mourning, beginning with a recognition of death and loss as moments of 
dislocation and following through with a discussion of mourning as an ethical 
practice and the conditions which enable mourning to take place. The second 
section will introduce a number of social and political practices that can be 
analysed through the lenses of the mourning process. In particular, I argue 
that instances of public-official discourse of national identity, the prospects 
of sudden shifts in economic practices and lifestyle, and instances of chronic 
illnesses and disability could be further explored under this theoretical 
perspective.  
 
Section 1: Theoretical Framework – Mourning as an ethical practice 
Discourse and Fantasy 
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In order to understand how mourning allows us to analyse social and political 
phenomena, it is important to describe how Discourse Theory and the 
category of fantasy provide relevant frameworks from which to look at social 
reality. From poststructuralist discourse theory, we draw upon the notion of 
radical contingency. Contingency, in this framework, can be better 
understood as the impossibility of achieving total closure. Although the term 
is more often used when studying socio-political identities, it can also be used 
to describe the tension that characterizes discursive narratives in their 
inability to be all-encompassing, being always subjected to a constitutive 
outside. This “outside” or external aspect to discourse can be considered 
constitutive because it plays a central role in creating discursive meaning. 
What contingency does, in this sense, is to highlight the limits of discourse 
and subjectivity (Glynos and Howarth, 2007), and makes it possible to 
recognize the existence of, if not fully grasp, alternative possibilities to the 
discursive narratives in place.  
From the discipline of psychoanalysis, we draw upon the insight that there is 
an affective investment in discourse and the category of fantasy. Before 
proceeding, it is necessary to establish the notion of dislocation. Dislocation, 
in concrete words, refers to the “moment when the subject’s mode of being is 
experienced as disrupted” (Glynos and Howarth, 2007:110). When in the 
presence of dislocation, subjects will most likely experience sensations of 
anxiety and uneasiness. As stated by Glynos (2014), the degree of the 
aforementioned affective investment in certain discursive elements may allow 
the subject to tolerate anxiety caused by the awareness of its radical 
contingency. For the category of fantasy, it important to establish two of its 
essential attributes: It is based on a logic of desire, wherein the sudden 
exposure of elements that are not fully assimilated by public-official discourse 
can produce embarrassment or guilt; this logic produces jouissance, or 
enjoyment, but this is not to be understood in the traditional sense of the 
word, instead taking on a meaning similar to “painful pleasure”. The other 
attribute is the protection from the anxiety that results from becoming aware 
of the radical contingency of social life and the experience of dislocation. 
In particular, fantasmatic elements (i.e. those that belong to the category of 
fantasy) help ward off that anxiety. There are two dimensions in which 
fantasy plays a role: According to Glynos and Howarth, these are the 
ideological and ethical dimensions. The ideological dimension “signals the way 
in which the subject becomes complicit in covering over the radical 
contingency of social relations by identifying with a particular discourse” 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007:117). What is implied by this is that the subject, 
under the grip of ideology, is insulated from the possible moments of 
disruption of its identity. Moreover, this has the consequences of making the 
subject forget the discursive origins of social practices, thereby continuing to 
live as if the current status quo were natural. The ethical dimension, in 
Perspectivas Revista de Ciencias Sociales |No. 2 Julio-Diciembre 2016 ISSN 2525-1112 
179 
contrast, makes the radical contingency of social life present to the subjects, 
and explores the way in which they relate to the experience of dislocation. 
Summarizing, when in the presence of dislocation, subjects will most likely 
experience sensations of anxiety and uneasiness. They, in turn, have two 
options: engage in either ideological or ethical practices. Mourning, as will be 
argued, is a particular instance in which subjects engage in an ethical 
practice.  
Loss, death, and mourning as an ethical practice 
Experiences of loss, and specifically the presence of death and/or its 
prospects, can be interpreted as particular moments of dislocation because 
they have disruptive effects on social life and in discursive narratives. 
Because of this, these experiences also register the radical contingency of the 
existence of subjects, both as individual, physical beings and as part of a 
wider network of social relations which give them meaning. It is the prospect 
or the experience of the death of that person that can make us reconsider and 
become more aware of the expectations and attachments we feel towards 
him/her.  
But this is not only applicable to death-related instances, but to loss in a more 
general sense. As is often the case, other elements that have become part of 
our routine are not recognized as contingent, and that conceals them within 
an illusion of inertia and permanence that they do not have. From certain 
habits to our health status and even particular objects we use in our everyday 
life (i.e. the car, the personal computer, etc…), the sudden loss of them can 
trigger an emotional response that we would likely not have foreseen, due to 
being unaware of the prominent role they play and the radical contingency of 
our narratives. Of course, this could be interpreted as necessary for the well-
being of the human psyche, as a profound awareness of potential instances of 
dislocation as a result of loss would put the subject under constant stress and 
anxiety. From a discourse theory psychoanalytical standpoint, Slavoj Zizek’s 
(1989) work regarding fantasy and ideology has been influential in explaining 
these affective attachments of subjects, as his work has associated the idea 
of engaging in an ‘ideological critique’ with what he calls ‘traversing the 
fantasy’, or the subject assuming a new position in relation to the object that 
was lost. But this new position is not adopted immediately – it involves a 
process of becoming aware of the elements of fantasy and their effects. 
Mourning, then, comes in as a process that helps the subject deal with 
dislocation that comes as a result of the experience of loss, particularly the 
death of someone. As stated by Jason Glynos, “Mourning the loss of someone 
is thus largely about mourning the loss of our attachment to the material 
support underpinning the symbolic and/or imaginary roles the deceased 
played for us in shaping our social relations and fantasy life” (Glynos, 
2014:140). In other words, mourning enables us to distinguish the recently 
deceased when they were alive, in a process of trying to establish who they 
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were as individuals, from the fact that they played a role in sustaining our 
own social identity and thus formed part of a larger narrative due to our 
experiences and interactions with them, a fantasmatic narrative 
characterized by unacknowledged contingency. I would argue that the 
importance of mourning arises from the fact that, although we recognize on a 
cognitive-intellectual, or even intuitive, level that death and losses are 
unavoidable, subjects are often not prepared to deal with them when these 
instances make themselves present. Similarly, this unpreparedness masks the 
emotional/affective responses that emerge when we inevitably have to face 
them. 
At this point it is necessary to highlight some important characteristics of the 
mourning process, and to establish some modalities in which this process is 
made difficult. In concrete terms, mourning could be said to be the successful 
processing of the grieving feelings that come as a reaction to loss. Sigmund 
Freud, who provided one of the first systematic attempts to examine the 
mourning process, stated in Totem and Taboo that “Mourning has a quite 
specific psychical task to perform: its function is to detach the survivors’ 
memories and hopes from the dead” (Freud, 2011 [1913]:65). According to 
Freud, a crucial attribute of mourning, however, is that there is nothing 
natural about it (Freud, 1917:248). What is meant by this is that the mourning 
process does not occur effortlessly, by default after a loss. Quite the 
contrary, mourning involves an engagement with the process and a willingness 
to recognize that the deceased will not come back, that there is a void left by 
their absence in our narratives. Yet, the subject should also acknowledge that 
life must continue without their presence. As stated by psychoanalyst Darian 
Leader, “this process of surveying and reshuffling thoughts and images will 
eventually exhaust itself, and the mourner will choose life over death” 
(Leader, 2009:60).  
Because mourning is not an automatic process, it is possible that it can 
become pathological or even blocked from reaching its ultimate resolution. 
Leader mentions two different modalities of mourning, pathological or 
complicated mourning, and melancholia. In the first, the process of choosing 
life over death “is arrested, due primarily to the presence of powerful 
feelings of hate mixed with our love for the deceased. In melancholia, the 
unconscious hatred of the one we’ve lost twists back to submerge us: we rage 
against ourselves as we once raged against the other, due to our unconscious 
identification with them” (Leader, 2009:60). Melancholia in particular is 
something that was of concern for Freud, as he was interested in the 
distortion of the mourning process. In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud (1917) 
describes the melancholic subject as one who presents very low opinions in 
self-regard, with a pervasive feeling of worthlessness and an abandonment of 
the instinct to remain alive. But of interesting note is his insight that, when 
directing at himself accusations of despicableness, they can also be applicable 
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to the deceased. He argued that this was actually a mechanism in which the 
person was allowed to feel hate in the form of self-reproach, as guilt would 
arise if the subject consciously acknowledged the feelings of hate and anger 
he/she may have had towards the person who had passed away. At this point, 
the subject has identified with the deceased, which Leader characterizes as 
punishing “the lost loved one in effigy, yet it is their own self which has 
become this effigy” (Leader, 2009:55).  
Although the traditional view of mourning emphasizes detachment from the 
source of loss, new perspectives on mourning actually suggest that subjects 
continue some form of attachment with the deceased, albeit in different 
form. They recommend the recognition of the person as deceased, while at 
the same time trying to construct a relationship between the deceased and 
the living as a new dynamic, one that is based on occasional memories of 
experiences together and the acknowledgment of the lessons that have been 
learned from them (Becker and Knudson, 2003). These new forms of mourning 
could, in theory, provide alternatives that can help subjects overcome 
complicated mourning or melancholia.  Although the detachment view is more 
applicable to critical political analysis, I will argue that, in certain cases of 
national identity, this newer form could also be useful in the analysis. 
Having described the processes of mourning and melancholia and discussed 
how death and loss are instances of dislocation, it is important to characterize 
mourning as an ethical practice within a psychoanalytical and poststructuralist 
framework. First, it asks us to deal with a moment of disruption. Because a 
key aspect of the mourning process is becoming aware of the emotional 
underpinnings and support structures the deceased provided us, it also 
requires an effort to recognize that those structures are gone forever with the 
deceased. At the same time, it implies bringing into the conscious mind and 
facing the radical contingency of our fantasy life and mode of being. I would 
argue that it is the reinforced attentiveness to contingency that results from 
loss that allows mourning as a process to be characterized as an ethical 
practice. In contrast, the failed modalities of mourning could be 
characterized as ideological practices. Although it could be argued that this is 
not the case because melancholia still brings some degree of attentiveness to 
the radical contingency, my argument is that subjects get too immersed in 
shifting the blame and negative feelings towards themselves, thus concealing 
to a degree the anxiety that results from facing radical contingency. 
Melancholia, in particular, functions as a way of avoiding either a successful 
detachment, in the traditional view, or successful integrative approach, as in 
the newer perspective. In other words, while mourning tries to get the 
subject to work through the feelings of anxiety, blocked mourning and 
melancholia “would fall on the side of eschewing this anxiety by retaining an 
overinvested and unconscious relation to its fantasy life” (Glynos, 2014:141).  
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Conditions that enable mourning 
One last theoretical aspect which should be discussed before proceeding to 
exemplify how mourning could be used in critical political analysis is to 
specify the conditions which would allow mourning to successfully take place. 
As both Leader (2009) and Glynos (2014) have stated, the social and 
institutional context in which mourning occurs plays a crucial role in the 
possibilities of success. In particular, Glynos states two key conditions: 1) “an 
event or site that enacts for an individual or collective subject a publicly 
shared recognition of loss”, and 2) “an appropriate context within which loss 
can be processed ethically and creatively integrated into one’s individual and 
collective life” (Glynos, 2014:144-145).  
The first condition is important, because it is not as straightforward as it 
seems for a number of reasons. Firstly, although death has thus far been 
assumed to be a specific instance of loss, death is not necessarily processed as 
a loss in all cases. This is due to the affective investment that may or may not 
be present, as well as the role the deceased played into our lives. In other 
words, if the deceased were heavily involved in the subjects’ narratives, then 
these subjects could process the deaths as losses. But the less involved the 
deceased were in a subjects’ narratives, the less likely it is that they register 
their deaths as losses, instead barely registering their absence at all. Second, 
even though the subjects may intuitively register the deaths as losses, they 
may not be able to consciously construct them as such. This is why rituals and 
activities in memory of the deceased are carried out: they actively register 
and construct the deaths as losses. This, according to Glynos (2014), would in 
turn enable the subjects to grant the deceased the respect and recognition of 
having once been human beings, and thus also the tacit recognition that they 
are worthy of being mourned.  
The second condition is perhaps more explicitly difficult than the first, 
because it requires a greater degree of action or cooperation from the other 
actors involved and, if applicable, an appropriate institutional setting. 
Because the deceased are not only material beings in the world, but are also 
imbued with meaning from their interactions with others within a wider 
network of social relations, some of their traits have an imaginary or symbolic 
representation within specific institutional settings, ranging from the family 
to a larger organization or even the government in the marco-level. For 
instance, the death of a particular public figure associated with freedom of 
expression in a country which is officially democratic but has evident aspects 
of authoritarianism may prove to be an experience of dislocation for different 
sectors of the population. This might be because this figure provided fierce 
and documented critiques of the government, something which a large part of 
the civil society supported, and the sudden loss of that figure both makes civil 
society aware of his/her contributions to the political sphere in the country, 
but also triggers anxiety related to the quality of the freedom of expression 
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that would, from then on, continue without that specific figure. To be 
registered, though, important sectors such as the media and NGOs would have 
to publicly address it for a sufficient period of time, thus providing an 
adequate context for mourning to take place, and the mourning process would 
not only be of the public figure but also of quality of freedom of expression in 
that country. What is to be highlighted by this example is the following 
question, key to the second condition of mourning: “whether the space and 
time given to us is appropriate to the task of determining how a death 
matters to us and how loss can be transformed into a creative and active 
shaper in individual and collective life” (Glynos, 2014:146). Of course, there is 
no given conditions which automatically set the stage for mourning to take 
place. Rather, depending on the figure being mourned, the space, time and 
other contextual elements, the conditions agreed for mourning will vary and 
will have to be discussed among those who registered the death as loss.   
 
Section 2: The role of mourning in critical political analysis 
Having introduced the role losses and death can play as instances of 
dislocation, the concept of mourning as an ethical practice in the 
poststructuralist discourse theory framework and the conditions that enable 
mourning, a discussion on how mourning can be used in critical political 
analysis can proceed. This section will present three different instances in 
which mourning provides useful insights: sociopolitical issues dealing related 
to national identity and public figures, social issues dealing with adjustment 
to chronic illness and disability, and economic issues dealing with 
unemployment and class identities.  
 
National identity: failed and successful mourning 
It is perhaps on instances of national identity or deceased people who 
represented something in the political life of a nation that could be more 
explicitly analysed in the framework presented so far. I provide two 
examples: one of blocked mourning in the case of the U.S., and then one of 
blocked mourning in the first instance and then successful mourning in Chile.  
Butler (2006) and Glynos (2014) have both addressed moments in American 
history after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent 
wars (Afghanistan and Iraq) that have the potential to be analysed through 
the lenses of mourning and its failed modalities. When then-president George 
W. Bush stated in the aftermath of 9/11 that the time for grief was over just 
after ten days of the destruction of the Twin Towers, the second condition of 
possibility of an appropriate social and institutional context and enough time 
to process grief was not met. Instead, in the wake of tragedy, what was asked 
of the population was to ‘move on’. But I would argue that grieving 
September 11, 2001 is not only about processing the destruction of the World 
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Trade Center and those who perished, but also about grieving the sense of 
security of the United States as a nation in the decade between the end of 
the Cold War and the terrorist attacks. This moment of dislocation signaled to 
America that there was a new enemy, not in the form of Communism, but in 
the form of terrorism, particularly Islamic terrorism. The actual institutional 
response was military mobilization against this new enemy. And in this sense, 
the embodiment of this response, the soldiers going to war, stood for self-
righteousness, feelings of security and democratic ideals that the United 
States as a nation wants to represent. My view is that this military 
mobilization, a moment in which the mourning process was stunted, was also 
of ideological nature because it shifted the attention from the experience of 
anxiety and the awareness of radical contingency in American life as a nation 
to an action that dwelled on the loss itself. It also did not allow for a moment 
of questioning traditional American values and exploring different alternatives 
for how the United States should behave in the international arena in the 21st 
century.  
I want now to bring up the example of how a newer approach to mourning 
might look in the context of critical political analysis by looking at the Chilean 
coup in 1973 and the death of Salvador Allende, which was first experienced 
as blocked mourning and subsequently became successful. The description of 
the evolution of sociopolitical dynamics in Chile since the coup made by 
Johnson (2014) provide the context to analyze the mourning processes. When 
Allende was in power, although he was democratically elected and had 
support among the popular classes, for many of them in the middle and upper 
classes in Chilean society Allende’s policies represented a financial cost to 
their lifestyles. Because of his socialist views, his policies tended to 
emphasize distribution and social programs and higher wages and as a result, 
more financial burden was experienced by the wealthier classes (although by 
no means excessive). When the coup occurred in September 11, 1973, and 
General Pinochet promised to implement policies to spur economic growth in 
Chile, there was a cautious sense of excitement mixed with feelings of 
uneasiness due to the violent nature of the coup and the death of Allende. 
But very soon after, repressive policies and the capture, arrest and murder of 
anyone who was deemed subversive by the new regime derailed the mourning 
process, making it impossible for the popular masses to mourn Allende’s loss. 
But the middle and upper classes also had reason to mourn: many of their 
previous liberties were gone, as Pinochet’s regime imposed many limitations 
on freedoms of association and speech, especially in the early years. This 
moment of failed mourning again masked feelings of anxiety that were being 
experienced by the population and concealed the radical contingency of social 
life in Chile by instead focusing on the promises of progress and economic 
prosperity that were to come, at least where public-official discourse was 
concerned. 
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I argue that this example provides an instance of the newer approach to 
mourning, because once the conditions were met for civil society to engage in 
successful mourning, it was not about detaching from Allende’s symbolic 
representation of democracy, but rather reintegrating it in the new 
democracy in Chile that would come after Pinochet’s dictatorship. This 
instance of mourning could be characterized as an ethical practice in the 
newer, integrative view, because the democratic regimes after the fall of the 
dictatorship recognized Allende’s role for democracy, but these new regimes 
were also neoliberal in nature. As a result, Allende has come to be regarded 
as a public figure in struggles for a different kind of democracy, one that is 
fairer in the distribution of wealth among Chile’s population. So Allende’s 
figure and what he represented can be said to bring attentiveness to the 
radical contingency of political regimes. It is not about ‘moving on’, but about 
integrating his memory into the political struggles of Chile’s neoliberal 
democratic regime, as a reminder that its neoliberal nature can be contested 
and realizing that alternative forms of democracy can also be possible. 
 
Adjustment to Chronic Illness and disability 
According to Sally E. Thorne, in cases of chronic Illness or disability, the 
patients may believe that the shifts in attitude from others in response to the 
onset of the illness or the presence of the disability is justified. They may 
experience feelings of worthlessness and being a burden as a result of these 
interactions, particularly regarding the costs implied by trying to manage the 
disease or by trying to take on a “normal appearance” (Thorne, 1993). The 
dislocation experienced is the result of the loss of the normal lifestyle, 
coupled with the addition of new financial costs. My view is that melancholic 
subjects remain attached to their past lifestyle, thus unable to successfully 
detach and begin the process of mourning. What they do instead is to dwell on 
the burdens associated with their new forced mode of being. I could 
characterize this as an ideological practice because it conceals both the 
contingency of this new lifestyle, as well as the contingency of outside 
structural impositions. For instance, although they would probably need to 
change some of their previous activities to adjust to their new limitations, 
this does not mean that they cannot experience a similar kind of pleasure or 
perform a functionally similar activity to a previous one. Let me highlight this 
by providing some contrasts: for subjects who due to their illness or disability 
find it difficult to move to their workplace, a subject who undergoes a 
successful mourning process is able to detach from the previous mode of being 
and come up with ideas in which they can work from home; whether or not 
this means a shift in employment is also dependent on the willingness of the 
employer to accept this new dynamic, but they could become self-employed 
by starting their own business at home. Melancholic subjects, in contrast, 
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would instead assign blame to themselves and remain in a new disabled 
identity that obstructs the path to new possibilities in their lifestyle.  
It is at this point that something should be explicitly stated. Chronically ill or 
disabled subjects can be considered to experience two moments of 
detachment. The first one is related to their old lifestyle. They need to 
recognize that their former lifestyle is gone and cannot get it back exactly as 
it was, and thus they can come to accept their new limitations. This, 
however, does not mean settling in a specific, disadvantaged or damaged 
identity. They need not think of themselves as ill nor disabled. This is where 
the second moment of detachment should occur: If they have constructed an 
identity of illness and disability, and they can successfully detach from that 
identity, they can integrate themselves into a different but equally functional 
lifestyle. Of course, constructing an identity of illness and disability does not 
occur by default and it is in the best interest of the subjects that it does not 
happen at all. If they, however, fall into this identity and remain trapped 
within it, then blocked mourning is being experienced. For mourning to be 
considered successful, the recognition of the new limitations and the 
integration to a new functional lifestyle must take place. What would 
characterize mourning as an ethical practice in this scenario is that it brought 
attentiveness to the radical contingency of two narratives, that of their 
former lifestyle and that of a lifestyle in a disabled identity. It also allowed 
subjects to successfully detach from those modes of being and come up with 
new possibilities of living. What is important about this form of mourning is 
the empowerment it brings to these subjects, as they can force themselves to 
take greater control of their own lives and think of ways to get over some 
structural barriers from their earlier narratives, as in the example, the 
subjects were forced to consider entrepreneurship as an alternative, among 
others. 
Unemployment and class resubjectivation 
As with the previous example, a similar issue is faced by those who face 
sudden unemployment or a shift in their economic conditions. Research by 
Gibson-Graham (2006) and Özselcuk (2006) has pointed out the dislocation 
experienced by workers who, when faced with the prospects of economic 
restructuring, fall back into a worker identity that views itself as morally 
superior and threatened. As highlighted by Özselcuk in particular, this class 
identity is sustained by the sensation of an injury caused by class relations, 
and as such, has an unconscious desire for the continuation of capitalism and 
exploitative relations between capital-owners and wage-labourers. This has 
relevant repercussions for political struggle: the melancholic subjects that 
continue to define themselves in the worker identity after experiencing 
distress from economic dislocation do not have opportunities to win that 
struggle, as they are unable to imagine alternative ways in which the economy 
could function. In this sense, maintaining the worker identity is to engage in 
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an ideological practice because it makes the subjects complicit in the 
continuation of capitalist class relations and shifts attentiveness away from 
the radical contingency of social life. This is similar to the experience of the 
ill and disabled subjects, who by maintaining their identity, they fail to 
consider ways in which to transform the dynamics of social relations. 
Özselcuk (2006) pointed out two strategies in which they could help workers 
engage in a successful mourning process. First, desidentification: a process in 
which workers were shown or told some cultural, political and economic 
problems resulting from capitalism. Second, providing examples of successful 
and feasible economic enterprises post-economic restructuring that were 
directed by former workers. Mourning in this instance implies a process of 
resubjectivation: detaching from the previous identity and class relations and 
the ethical practice of becoming aware of the contingency of discursive 
narratives and realizing that there are viable alternatives to current economic 
practices, such as Workers Self-Directed Enterprises, as suggested by Wolff 
(2012). This would not necessarily imply a complete detachment from the 
worker identity, but rather a reconfiguration of certain attributes related to 
it. In this sense, it means putting an end to the static identity of the worker 
as exploited, transforming it into an identity capable of self-governance.  
Some considerations on mourning as an ethical practice and conceptual 
tool 
A short way to summarize what has been said thus far is that mourning can be 
associated with the ethical dimension within poststructuralist discourse 
theory, and can be understood as becoming aware of discursive narratives and 
practices. In contrast, stunted mourning or melancholia can arise from staying 
immersed in these discursive narratives and practices, unaware of its effects 
in everyday life. Although, as seen, these concepts are useful conceptual tools 
for the analysis of a variety of social and political phenomena, there are some 
considerations to keep in mind for its adequate use.  
Perhaps most importantly, when characterizing mourning as an ethical 
practice, it must be clear that the “ethical” attribute is placed within its 
meaning in poststructuralist discourse theory, and is not to be confused with 
the Western philosophical tradition of ethics. Mourning can indeed be 
considered ethical in the Western philosophical sense in a variety of 
instances, such as the creation of public memorials (Weinrich, 2004).  But if 
mourning can be considered a powerful ethical stance (in the Western sense), 
so too can melancholia be thought of as ethical. Two examples can help 
illustrate this point. An individual one is Jean Amery’s decision to practice 
“the ethics of resentment” as long as people in Germany in the 50’s and 60’s 
refused to engage with the atrocities committed during the Nazi Regime. He 
viewed this failure to ‘move on’, or to engage in successful mourning, as a 
necessary ethical practice, because for him the conditions that could ensure 
that such political phenomena would not happen again had not yet been met 
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(Amery, 2009). A contemporary collective instance of melancholic subjects 
are the groups of parents, NGOs and international organizations that are 
trying to find clear evidence of the fate of the 43 missing students of 
Ayotzinapa, in Guerrero, Mexico. They have not been able to bring the case to 
a close, and such a massive and highly mediatized forced disappearance of 
people has only yielded contradictory reports. It is a complex social and 
political event for Mexico (one that exposes widespread corruption and mass 
atrocities), but civil society networks have not allowed the case to disappear 
into oblivion – they are instead pressuring the government and international 
institutions to reach a clear and verifiable conclusion (González Rodríguez, 
2015). Both of these examples can be considered “ethical” in the Western 
sense because they show people standing up for ideals of Western justice, but 
it does not mean that melancholy is an ethical practice within discourse 
theory. This does not imply, however, that there cannot be practices of 
mourning that are ethical in both Western philosophy and in discourse theory.  
A second aspect to be considered is that mourning, for the subject, is a 
necessary step, but not enough by itself, to produce social and political 
transformation. It is important to remember that discourse theory is situated 
within a critical tradition – one that has figures such as Marx, Gramsci, 
Foucault, Derrida, etc… - and as such is concerned with discovering the 
different forms of power, oppression and possibilities of transformation. 
Important theorists such as Noam Chomsky (2011) and Ernesto Laclau (2014), 
among others, have argued that the current era, one in which the neoliberal 
discourse has become hegemonic, has focused on the accumulation of power 
and wealth to the detriment of the well-being of the majority of the 
population, ignoring its demands for basic social justice. Mourning, as a 
process for subjects and a conceptual tool for social scientists, is a component 
that enables one to engage in ‘ideological critique’ – to discover the seams of 
a hegemonic discursive narrative and its underpinning elements, the 
neoliberal one in this case. But if the mourning process reveals a particular 
discourse and thus empowers people to overcome it, for social transformation 
to take place there needs to be organization and collective action.  This is, in 
essence, what Marx and Engels (2012) advised the proletariat to do during the 
nineteenth century in the struggle against capitalism, and what Laclau and 
Mouffe (2014) have recommended as well for the confrontation against 
neoliberalism, integrating discourse and its elements as tools.  
A final consideration is that the use of the concept of mourning as a critical 
political analysis tool should not be confined to either death-related topics 
nor to the ideological critique against neoliberalism. This was shown when 
discussing the adjustment to chronic illness and disability, but it can also 
question the foundations of legalistic discourse and transitional justice in a 
way that represents an ethical practice from a poststructuralist discourse 
theory stance. This is the project of Jill Stauffer (2015) when focusing her 
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research on ethical loneliness – the loss of one’s world by losing the very basic 
assumptions about security and how the world operates, compounded by the 
isolation of not being heard. Mourning becomes an ethical practice here 
because it allows subjects to question their most basic assumptions and ideas, 
thus becoming aware of several discourses and several forms of injustice that 
they were previously unaware of. Stauffer’s research deals more with 
traditional Western philosophy, International Law and Conflict Resolution, but 
it provides evidence that the concept of mourning from the discourse theory 
approach can be used in a variety of areas of study in the social sciences and 
the humanities.  
Conclusions 
The main insights of this article have centered on two aspects and some 
considerations. The first is that mourning can be considered an ethical 
practice in the framework of poststructuralist discourse theory because of the 
attentiveness it brings to the radical contingency of social relations, and 
because of the possibilities of transformation of the subject when mourning is 
successful. For successful mourning to take place, two conditions of possibility 
were discussed: the publicly shared recognition of the loss, either through a 
specific activity or a place/site for mourning, and the appropriate context in 
terms of institutional responses, place and time. The second aspect is that 
mourning can be used in critical political analysis, both in instances that are 
death-related and in instances that focus on dislocation. This has been 
presented with the examples of national identity and public figures, which 
were more clearly involved with death as the central focus, and the examples 
of chronic illness and disability and class resubjectivation, in which other 
forms of dislocation were involved. Finally, some considerations regarding the 
concept of mourning were provided, showing that it may overlap with Western 
ethics although it should not be confused with them, and elaborating upon its 
importance for the subjects engaged with it, as well as for research in social 
sciences and humanities. 
As concluding remarks, I want to comment on what I consider to be most 
useful aspect of engaging in a successful mourning process: the possibility of 
transformation and of changing the current conditions of social relations. I 
believe that experiences of death and loss have a profound impact on the 
narratives in which subjects remain immersed. But those moments of 
dislocation are necessary and able to signal to the subjects the need for a 
response. It is from this point on that subjects can engage in mourning 
attempts. But those attempts which are successful are instances of change 
and transformation in social relations, instances which could otherwise have 
been avoided. Successful mourning is, then, a manner which has crucial 
implications for social relations in a given space and time: mainly, that it can 
challenge and change the status quo and bring about new conditions in which 
other sociopolitical and economic values, practices and regimes take place.  
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